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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

During World War II when Soviet forces defended the Transcarpathian Oblast, they learned that German armies had difficulty in penetrating the larger watershed areas of the Podkarpatska Rus sector: Soviet artillery was heavily concentrated in the Podkarpatska Rus passes. The majority of the gun emplacements and heavy guns were trained towards the West. From lessons gained in warfare during World War II, Soviet strategists decided in 1951 that very few large guns were needed to defend this area from Western invasion. They recalled that during World War II, German forces engaged in the Podkarpatska Rus region had to by-pass these passes (that is, penetrate the Ukraine proper by going to the right and the left of that region).

In 1951, Soviet engineers (according to Hungarian escapees) ordered the removal of some artillery, but by and large instructed the Soviet military commanders to turn the gun emplacements around and mount the guns facing the southeast and northwest.

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According to the Hungarian soldiers who escaped from the area, the remounting of such ordnance was effected. They reasoned that the Soviet strategists thus feel confident that they can successfully defend this area from encirclement or direct penetration by Western ground forces.

50X1 further discussions concerning Soviet military strategy. The only other  
50X1 factor of possible significance was what general Soviet strategy might be in the  
50X1 event another war developed in Europe. Several Hungarians [ ] by  
virtue of association and conversation with Soviet infantry officers and enlisted  
men, [ ] discussed the possibility of World War III. On the basis of such con-  
versations, a number of the Hungarian soldiers were of the same opinion. Some of  
these opinions are:

- A. The USSR has absolutely no faith in effective cooperation from the Satellite armed forces.
- B. The Soviet armed forces have very little regard for the military capabilities of such Satellites as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.
- C. The Soviets will not try to defend their Satellites in central Europe, according to these people. The Soviets state that they don't want to make the same mistake Hitler did by extending his supply lines for extensive distances.
- D. Finally, the Soviets, in the event of ground attack, would fight in central Europe only if such engagements were definitely profitable. The escapees add that the Soviets' real line of defense against Western forces in Europe would include a line set up from Riga to Odessa. The USSR official personnel referred to it as the Riga-Odessa line.

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